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1. Introduction 
 
The eleventh of February 1990 was a historic day that will be etched on the memories of all 
South Africans for evermore. After 27 years of imprisonment Nelson Mandela was released 
(Limb, 2008, p. 99). In his speech after his release he addressed the economic sanctions that 
were implemented against apartheid. Mandela declared: “to lift sanctions now would be to run 
the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid‟ (Mandela, 
1990). In the years after apartheid Mandela continued to state that economic sanctions had 
helped to stop apartheid (Levy, 1999, p.2). However, his opinion about the contribution of 
sanctions to the abolishment of apartheid was not shared by everyone. On the side that regards 
sanctions as having no effect on the dismantling of the regime is the last apartheid President, 
de Klerk. De Klerk had mentioned that conflict and violence were the determining factors for 
his consideration to end apartheid. De Klerk also denied the effectiveness of the sanctions in 
1993 when he accepted the Nobel Prize for Peace (Gerhart & de Villiers, 1995, p. 197). Even 
the scientific community seems to be inconclusive on the effectiveness of sanctions against 
Apartheid. Levy perfectly captures this inconclusiveness: „it is impossible to argue 
conclusively that trade sanctions failed in the South African case‟ (Levy, 1999, p. 420). The 
case of South Africa has often been used on both sides, to prove that sanctions did work and 
to prove that sanctions did not work.  The goal of this research is to find out which side was 
right about the effectiveness of economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. The research 
question is: were the economic sanctions a determining factor contributing to the dismantling 
of the apartheid regime?          
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2 International attention and the economic sanctions:  
 
 
2.1 The beginning and the characteristics of the sanction episode 
 
In 1960, the Apartheid system attracted international attention when sixty-nine black Africans 
were killed in Sharpeville by the police during a protest against the pass laws (Clark & 
Worger, 2001, p.5). In response, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 134. 
The Council recognized that the event was caused by the apartheid policies of the government 
and called for the abandonment of apartheid. In 1962, The United Nations General Assembly 
created the non-binding resolution 1761which asked its members to cut off fiscal and trade 
ties with South Africa (Doxey, 1980, p.61; David, 1995, p.217). It formed the start of a 
sanction episode that lasted from 1962 until 1994 (HSEO, 2007, p.78)  the sanction episode 
knows two characteristics. Firstly, it is one of the longest sanctions episodes in the history. 
Most sanctions do not last longer than a few years, so 32 years of sanctions is an exception 
HSEO, 2007, p.78). Secondly, there was a great variety of sanctions imposed by a great 
number of senders. In the heydays of the sanction episode there were trade sanctions (import 
and export sanctions) and financial sanctions imposed by international institutions and many 
individual countries (Hefti & Staehelin-Witt, 2008). In the South African case, two important 
forms of trade sanctions are arms and oil embargoes. Arms, oil and finance were vital to the 
economy and the functioning of the apartheid regime. Oil and arms were needed to police the 
country and suppress upheaval (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.103). What finance and oil have 
in common is the fact that they were both needed to run the economy. Foreign finance was a 
necessity for South African economic growth and oil was needed for the domestic transport 
system (Riddell, 1986, pp.1-4). So without oil trade and finance economic growth would be 
impeded. Trade sanctions and finance sanctions will be briefly discussed. Their effectiveness 
will be evaluated in the analysis. 
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2.2 Important sanctions: 
 
2.2.1 Arms embargo: 
 
The arms embargo was not implemented only to combat apartheid, but also to stop the 
aggressive attitude of South Africa. Until 1990, South Africa invaded Namibia and had 
military conﬂicts with the surrounding countries. The international community figured that 
South Africa depended on military force to repress its own people and on the battlefields 
(Labuschagne, 2009). Therefore, an arms embargo could kill two birds with one stone.   
 In August 1963, with resolution 181 the Council recommended the members to stop 
the shipment of arms to South Africa. A voluntary arms embargo was chosen over a 
mandatory one, because the US and the UK opposed any broader action (Doxey, 1980, p.62). 
In 1977, the arms embargo became mandatory by the Security Council Resolution 418 which 
condemned South Africa‟s “acts of repression” (the UN, 1977). Besides export sanctions, 
there was also a voluntary import embargo implemented. In 1984 the Security Council created 
Resolution 558 that requested all members to stop importing ammunition, arms and military 
vehicles from South Africa (the UN, 1984).       
 In response to these institutional calls, many countries decided to stop arms trade with 
South Africa. For instance, Britain‟s government prohibited all forms of arms exports to 
South Africa in 1964 (Doxey, 1980, p.62). The US chose a more incremental path to block 
arms trade. The US implemented sanctions in 1963 blocking the shipment of weapons. The 
embargo was expanded to include high-tech equipment for the military in 1977 and expanded 
to include dual-use products such as computers in 1986 (Edgar, 1990, p.182).  
 
 
2.2.2 Oil sanctions: 
 
The supply of oil was called the „Achilles of South Africa‟, because South Africa had no 
discovered oil reserves. It was an opportunity for the sender countries (Sanlam, 1979, p. 1-
12).             
 The most important oil sanctions against South Africa came from OPEC. They 
introduced an oil embargo in 1973 against all supporters of Israel. This is called the oil crisis 
of 1973 (Garavini, 2011, p. 473).  Due to South Africa‟s apartheid and relations with Israel, 
oil sanctions were implemented. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Iraq stopped shipping oil to South 
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Africa after the call. They supplied almost 50 percent of the total South Africa‟s import of 
crude oil before the crisis (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p. 106). The oil crisis ended in 1974 and 
many sanctions against other countries were lifted. However, the embargo against South 
Africa remained. In 1977 almost all OPEC members (Hengeveld & Rodenburg, 1995, p.13).
 Supporters for oil sanctions also existed outside OPEC. In 1963, the UN General 
Assembly called for oil sanctions against South Africa by creating resolution 1899, but could 
not persuade the Security Council to adopt mandatory oil sanction (Chesterman, Johnstone & 
Malone, 2016, p 373). These calls were answered voluntarily by several institutions and 
countries. In 1981, Denmark and Norway both stopped exporting oil to South Africa. The 
European Economic Community prohibited oil trade with South Africa in 1985 and the 
United States introduced the Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 which banned oil transfers to South 
Africa (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p. 106).       
   
 
Financial sanctions 2.2.3 
 
South African economy was dependent on foreign capital for economic growth. South Africa 
was a developing county and there were many new industries that needed investment. The 
industry growth became seriously dependent on imports of machinery and transport 
equipment. Forty percent of the imports were capital goods by the 1980s (Crawford & Klotz, 
1999, p. 160). Additionally, the South Africa often borrowed money from the IMF and private 
banks. This need for foreign capital made financial sanctions an interesting too (Trewhela, 
1990).            
 Before any international institutional financial sanctions were adopted, many 
governments had decided for themselves to block loans and investments. Japan was relatively 
early, because it implemented a ban on direct investment in 1964 and on loans in 1975. 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland restricted or entirely prohibited loans in 
the 1970‟s (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p. 161).       
 In 1983 the first international financial institutional sanctions were implemented. The 
IMF denied South Africa additional funds. This refusal was caused by the US that used it 
power in the IMF to block loans to flow to South Africa. The US itself prohibited new 
portfolio investments, direct investments, loans and credits in 1986. The EEC and the 
Commonwealth followed in 1986 by banning new investments. (Hefti & Staehelin-Witt, 
2008, p.1-3) 
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3. South Africa analyzed with the theoretical framework of economic sanctions  
 
 
3.1 The economic sanction literature in general  
 
What must be noted is that the discussion about the economic sanctions against South Africa 
is part of a broader discussion about the effectiveness of economic sanctions in general. Do 
economic sanctions work effectively and under what conditions do they work best? One of 
the most influential scientific publications of the second wave is the book Economic Sanctions 
reconsidered by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg (Hereafter HSEO) first published in 1985. 
HSEO created a database with economic sanctions cases found that in a third of the cases 
economic sanctions were successful (Hufbauer, et al, 2007, p 258). Their work made the main 
focus of the scientific community shift to searching factors that influence the effectiveness of 
sanctions (Hufbauer et al, 2007, ix). Evidence was found for the following: target‟s regime 
type, policy goals of the sanctions, economic and political costs, target‟s economic strength 
and political stability, the presence of black knights (sanction busters), unilateral vs. 
multilateral sanctions, sanction implementation speed, issue salience, type of sanctions 
companion policies and relation between target and sender. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical framework of sanctions applied on the South African case:  
 
The South African case might be one of the most complex sanction cases. Factors that did 
play a role in the South African case are: policy goal in combination with target‟s regime 
type, target‟s economic strength, sanction implementation speed, economic costs, political 
strength, political costs, black knights, issue saliency and type sanctions. These factors are 
closely interwoven and cannot be seen separately. It is a network of factors that had an 
influence on the outcome of the sanction episode, but also on the factors itself. For instance, 
political strength was negatively influenced by issue saliency and positively influenced by the 
South African regime type. Another complexity of the sanction episode is gradual change that 
some factors went through. For instance, South Africa gradually became political unstable 
and the issue salience increased gradually (Michael, Kennedy & Zald, 2000,p. 348). Two 
phases can be distinguished in the South African sanction episode. The first phase runs from 
1962 to the mid-1980s and the second phase runs from the mid-1980s to 1994. The big 
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difference between the two phases is the level of international issue salience and domestic 
political unrest. In the first phase sanctions were weak and the sender countries lacked 
willingness to see the sanctions succeed. In the second phase, more effort was generated by 
the sender countries due to the increasing pressure of the global anti-apartheid movements. 
More and better sanctions were introduced and more sanction senders arose. The sanctions 
contributed to higher economic and political costs that eventually reached an unbearable level 
of hardship that led to the abolishment of apartheid. The analysis will be split up in two parts. 
The first part will discuss the factors that caused sanctions in the period from 1962 until the 
mid-1980s to fail. The second part will discuss the factors that caused the sanctions in the 
period from the mid-1980s until 1994 to succeed.  
 
3.2 A hard task to fulfill with weak sanctions: 1962 until mid-1980s 
  
 
3.2.1 Type of policy goal in combination with regime type:    
   
HSEO distinguish five different policy goals: modest policy changes, regime change and 
democratization, disruption of military adventures, military impairment and other major 
policy changes. The success rate depended on the type of policy goal pursued. Sanctions that 
involved modest changes in policy had a success rate of 51 percent (HSEO, 2007, p.66). 
Cases involving attempts to change regimes had a success rate of 32 percent (HSEO, 2007, 
p.668).  The disruption of minor military adventures has a success rate of only 21 (HSEO, 
2007, p.69-70).         
 HSEO give the advice to beware of autocratic regimes (HSEO, 2007, p.166). Their 
findings suggest that when the sanction goal is categorized as a regime change the success 
rate mentioned above is lower. HSEO state that there is no benefit for an autocrat in 
complying when the demand is for democratization, because in many cases the autocratic 
regime guarantees the leader or leaders a source of wealth and security (HSEO, 2007, p.52). 
In such case compliance costs are extremely high and the benefits are extremely low for the 
leaders.           
 HSEO coded South Africa with a 2 in their regime index (HSEO, 2007, p.78). This 
means that South Africa was neither an autocracy (1), nor a democracy (3).  South Africa was 
an anocracy: a regime type that is an „incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and 
practices‟ (Marshall, Monty, Cole, Benjamin, 2014, p 21). Democratic characteristics were 
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the free elections for the withe population. An autocratic characteristic was the suppression of 
the black and coloured population. They had no political rights and their human rights were 
ignored while their citizenship got denied.        
 The policy goal was to change the regime. It would mean the end of white minority 
rule and many white South Africans were afraid that abolishment would have negative 
consequences for the white population. In the eyes of the whites, a „black‟ government would 
make the white population give up their wealth and lands (De Klerk, 1999, p.70). 
Additionally, there would be no room for the apartheid ruling party, the NP, in a new 
democratic system. A party betrayed its own people by abolishing apartheid and had 
discriminated the black population for years would not be chosen by white voters, nor be 
chosen by black voters. So, the NP party was not eager to hit the final nail in its own coffin 
(De Klerk, 1999, p.70).          
 Throughout the sanction episode, the government was fighting for its own life, 
because of the regime type in combination with the sanctions goal. This perfectly suits with 
the HSEO findings described above. The combination of the regime type and the sanctions 
goal is one of the most important factor in understanding the fierceness and thoughtfulness of 
the South African government in the fight against sanctions. South Africa was more willing to 
deal with high costs to keep apartheid intact, because it seemed to be the only choice they had. 
  
 
3.2.2 Economic costs for the target 
 
The economic costs that sanctions create for the target are important factors that affect the 
success rate of sanctions. The higher the costs, the higher the change that sanctions are 
successful. The idea behind this variable is that an unbearable pain level needs to be reached 
in order to force obedience. The target economic costs as percentage of the GNP is twice as 
low in failure cases as in successes on average (HSEO 2007, p. 106). They also found that 
when the goal is regime change and/or democratization the costs in success cases are fifty 
percent higher than in failure cases. In failure cases the average costs as a percentage of the 
GNP is 2.3 percent and in success cases that is 3.4 percent.  (HSEO, 2007, p.168).  
 On the basis of the South African case, it can be concluded that economic costs 
inflicted depend on a three factors. Firstly, it depends on strength of the economic sanctions. 
Secondly it depends on the economic strength of the target country. A country that is 
economically strong will cope better with economic sanctions than countries that are weak 
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(HSEO, 2007; Drury 1998). An economic strong target is more likely capable of applying 
counter strategies to avoid the economic hardship that surpasses the bearable level. Thirdly, 
the capability of applying counter strategies on the right time to prevent economic costs 
depends on the sanction implementation speed. HSEO (2007, p.172) state that a strategy of 
incremental implementation affords the target more time to adapt by finding other trade 
partners and building domestic industries However, if sanctions are quickly and unexpectedly 
implemented the target might not be on time to prevent economic hardship, even when the 
target is strong. All three factors will be addressed, but the weak sanction factor was caused 
by the South Africa‟s economic and international political strength and will therefore be 
explained under these subheadings.          
 
 
3.2.2.1Target’s economic strength of South Africa 
 
South Africa engaged in economic interdependency relationships due to its outward orientated 
economy. Two important countries that were depended on South Africa were the two main 
trading partners, the US and Britain. South Africa was the biggest gold producers. In 1970 
South Africa produced approximately 1000 metric tons of gold, while the second largest 
producer only produced around 60 metric tons (Williams, 2015) Until 1971, Gold was the 
foundation for the value of the dollar and therefore also for other currencies. South African 
gold needed to be pumped into the world markets to keep the American and British currencies 
steady (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.86). Additionally, until the mid-1960s, Britain and the US 
were also completely reliant on uranium imports from South Africa for their nuclear industry 
(Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.76). Dependent countries with their own interest at stake are less 
likely to impose adequate sanctions, because senders also try to keep the costs of conflict for 
themselves as low as possible (Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007, p.415). In such case, symbolic 
sanctions are to be expected (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997, p.616)     
 With Britain and the US South Africa was in good company, because both countries 
were members of the UN Security Council, Britain had major influence in the 
Commonwealth, while the US was dominant in the IMF (van den Berg, 2011 p.15). Their 
economic dependency was the reason (besides the political dependency reason that will be 
discussed under the subheading political strength) why sanctions were weak in the first period 
of the sanction episode running from 1962 until the mid-1980s. In that period the 
shortcomings of Apartheid were partly ignored and the United States and Britain used their 
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vetoes in the UN Security Council to hinder everything more than voluntary sanctions 
(Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.86). There was a voluntary arms embargo put in place in 1963. 
This embargo did not become mandatory until 1977 after the Soweto massacres (Guelke, 
2005, p.195). Additionally, there never were mandatory oil sanctions introduced by the UN. 
OPEC was the only organization to implement an influential oil embargo. This oil embargo 
was not implemented until 1973 and contained many loopholes (Chesterman, et. al 2016, 
p.373). The fact that the two main trading partners of South Africa were reluctant to impose 
adequate sanctions and the failure of the sanctions in the first period of the episode suits well 
with the findings of Mclean and Whang (2010, p.427). They found evidence that sanctions are 
more likely to fail when they are not supported by the target‟s major trading partners.   
 Its resilient economy gave South Africa the opportunity to apply counter strategies. 
The two economic strategies used were applying import substitution and finding black knights 
(term for allies in the sanction literature) (Levy, 1999). The emergence of black knights will 
be elaborately addressed further on in this thesis.  The use of counter strategies by strong 
economic targets corresponds with the Pape‟s explanation why sanctions are often 
unsuccessful. He argues that a developed target with good administrative capabilities can 
reduce economic hardship caused by sanctions (Pape 1997, p.93). This process is easier for a 
country with a strong economy, because it has more resources to create and protect the new 
industry (Bruton, 1989, p.1606.) Various industries that were important for the South African 
apartheid regimes were established within South Africa years before the sanction started to 
work effectively.           
 For example, The South African arms industry flourished in 1960‟s.  In 1964 
Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) was brought 
to life. Armscor was an organization that consisted of a few state-owned companies combined 
with private companies that together regulated the arms industry. They had to makes sure that 
as many weapons as possible needed by South African army on South African soil 
(Hengeveld & Rodenburg, 1995, p.273). In the 1960s, government decided to upscale the 
budget of research and development for military research. In the 1960s, less than 15 percent 
of all research and development spending went to arms-related research and by the 1989 it 
had increased to 32 percent (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.54). This import substitution caused 
the South African arms industry to grow gigantically. The effect of the import substitution by 
the late 1980s was that the South African arms import was decreased with more than a half 
compared to the beginning of the 1960‟s (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.54).  Another effect was 
that South Africa became the seventh biggest arms producer in the 1980s (Doxey, 1987, p 
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112).              
 Another example is the import substitution taking place in the oil industry. South 
Africa had no discovered oil reserves and had to import all its fuel. The GNP growth allowed 
the government to follow a varied energy policy throughout the sanction episode. To replace 
their oil shortage they explored the South African soil for mossgass, increased coal 
production, started synthetic fuel production from mossgass and coal, and introduced nuclear 
and hydroelectric power (Hengeveld & Rodenburg, 1995, p.198).Three subsidized plants 
were built (Sasol 1,2 and 3) in the apartheid era that transformed coal into oil. The first plant 
was built as in 1955, years before the OPEC oil sanctions (Hengeveld & Rodenburg, 1995). 
During the heydays of coal-to-oil production in the 1980s Sasol created around half of the 
gasoline needs in the country (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.115).  Crawford and Klotz (1999, 
p.121) state that South Africa could not have dealt with the oil sanction if they did not have 
the coal-to-oil production plants. Therefore, import substitution was very vital to South 
Africa.              
 
 
3.2.2.2 Incremental implementation  
 
On top of the weak sanctions in the beginning, South Africa could see the sanctions coming. 
The South African government was warned before embargoes were implemented. Sometimes 
years of hesitancy and international dialogue preceded the sanction implementation (Crawford 
& Klotz 1999, p.12). For example, there were many UN calls for action before official 
resolutions were adopted. As early as 1946, the South African discrimination policies were 
put on the agenda (South African History Online, 2011). Import substitution of the military 
industry commenced years before the resolution of 1963 introduced a voluntary embargo 
(Levy 1999, p.4). The time needed to consider and impose sanctions is one of the most 
influential factors in understanding the slow downfall of the apartheid system. The South 
African industries and government had the opportunity to bring on board black knights and 
employ import substitution before sanctions were imposed. It is clear that the slow 
implementation of the sanctions had a negative effect on the capability of sanctions to cause 
economic hardship (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.12). The potential discomfort that all 
sanctions together could have caused is higher than the actual pain felt. Unexpected strong 
sanctions could have bought South Africa no time to build strategic policies to outmaneuver 
senders.        
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3.2.2.3The emergence of Black knights in multilateral corporation:  
 
Another strategy that South Africa applied to avoid economic hardship was trading with allies 
that ignore the sanctions, black knights. HSEO (2007, p.8) state that sanctions are more likely 
to fail if the target state has powerful allies that support the target state. On the basis of the 
South African case, it can be concluded that the capability of a target to find black knights 
depends on two factors. Firstly, it depends on the target‟s relation with other countries. 
Secondly, it depends on the willingness of potential black knights to turn into black knights. 
The international institutions can decrease the willingness.     
 South Africa had many international links due to its history as an exporter of primary 
products.  It used these international links to find black knights fill up the loss of disappearing 
trading partners (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.160). For example, South Africa used Iran to fill 
up the oil import gaps that arose after Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar stopped exporting oil to 
South Africa in 1973. This halt in export could have had a big impact, because the import of 
oil of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar amounted to nearly 50 percent of South Africa‟s oil 
import. But Iran, which already had a close relationship with South Africa, increased its oil 
exports to South Africa in 1973 and by 1978 Iran provided 96 percent of South African oil 
import (Hengeveld & Rodenburg, 1995, p.13). The fact that South Africa had a strong and 
outward orientated economy and was able to avoid economic hardship through black knights 
suits with the findings of Önder & Yilmazkuday (2014). They found that more trade partner 
diversification correlates with economic strength. States can utilize their network of trading 
partners to compensate for low levels of high levels of inflation. This might also be the case 
for the pain caused by economic sanctions. In this way, countries with many trade linkages 
might have a higher change to find black knight among their trade partners.  
 The capability of finding black knights also depends on the capability of international 
institutions to hold potential black knights in line. Drezner‟s (2003, pp.75-98) and Drury‟s 
(1998, p.507) findings suggest that when cooperation is sought within an international 
organization the sanctions will be more effective than unilateral sanctions, because 
international organizations can provide black knights with side-payments. However, when 
cooperation is happening outside the framework of an international organization sanctions 
will be less effective than unilateral sanctions. Early and Spice (2015) found results that 
smaller institutions are better at suppressing the emergence of black knights than those 
demanded by bigger ones. One of the reasons why smaller is better is the fact that smaller 
institutions mostly have greater homogeneity and therefore it is easier to impose widely 
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supported and costly sanctions (2015, p.344). However, this was not the case in the South 
African sanction episode, because small and larger institutions were not capable of stopping 
the emergence of black knights. Before the mid-1980s, there were two international 
institutions that imposed sanctions: the UN and OPEC.      
 What must be noted is that from the period of 1962 until 1973 sanctions only came 
from the UN and individual countries. As mentioned above, the UN chose voluntary 
embargoes (arms embargo in 1963 and an oil embargo in 1987) over mandatory (Doxey, 
1980, p.62). Additionally The UN arms embargo resolutions never contained a list of 
embargoed items. Individual countries had to decide for themselves which technology and 
other goods contributed to military capabilities (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.54). This caused 
the arms embargo to have loopholes and black knights to arise. The United States, Great 
Britain, France, Germany all used flexible interpretations of the UN arms embargo in order to 
sustain arms trade with South Africa (Robinson & Boutwell, 1996, p.599). Government-
owned companies in these countries provided South Africa with dual-use technology with a 
potential military application that the UN embargo did not ban explicitly, such as computers 
and vehicles (Robinson & Boutwell, 1996, p.599). These black knights were neither willing to 
find and punish private companies. For example, two gun manufactures from US transported 
millions of rounds of ammunition and thousands of weapons to South Africa in the 1970‟s.  
Firms from West Germany exported all the needed parts of an ammunition manufacture plant 
in 1980s (Robinson & Boutwell, 1996, p.600). It is certain that South Africa could not 
become the seventh biggest arms producer in the world in the 1980s without the help of black 
knights (Doxey, 1987, p 112).          
 OPEC was also not capable to stop the emergence of black knights, despite its smaller 
size and greater homogeneity. This characteristic helps OPEC exert pressure on its members 
(Sobel, 2012). In the South African case, these characteristics did not help. As mentioned 
above, Iran did become a black knight despite the OPEC oil embargo that started in 1973. 
However, Iran was not the only country. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran stopped 
exporting oil to South Africa and from that point on it became hard for South Africa to buy oil 
at normal market prices (Hengeveld & Rodenburg, 1995, p.21). Access to oil was only hard to 
attain for a short period. After 1979 the black market was used by South Africa and oil was 
purchased secretly, mainly from Oman and The United Arab Emirates. Oil bought on the 
black markets was transported on ships from private companies that sailed under numerous 
ﬂags, for example, Transworld Oil sailing under the Dutch flag Hengeveld & Rodenburg, 
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1995, p.66). The effect that the black knights had on the oil supply was that South Africa 
never ran out of oil.            
  
 
3.2.2.4 Actual Economic costs for South Africa  
 
It is important to note that estimating the costs of sanctions to South Africa is a hard task, 
because it is impossible to know how the South African economy would have performed 
without sanctions. There are also other factors besides the economic sanctions that affected 
the economic performance of South Africa, such as the economic crises in the 1980‟s (Kandé, 
2010). Although it is certain that the economic costs of sanctions were reduced by black 
knights and import substitution, economic costs could never be prevented totally. South 
Africa‟s fight against the sanctions was expensive, because clandestine trade often happened 
at disadvantageous „apartheid prices‟ and import substitution was inefficient. The South 
African government used resources to bypass the sanctions and could have spent these 
resources directly on suppression (Guelke, 2005, p. 195). The economic costs for South 
Africa have been estimated by HSEO and were documented in their database. Their database 
includes the sanctions imposed by the UN lasting from 1962 until 1994 and belonging to the 
first period sanctions (HSEO, 2007, p.116). The sanction episode was estimated to cause 
economic cost that equaled 1.2 percent of the South African GNP (HSEO, 2007, p.116). As 
mentioned above, successful and failed sanctions with the goal to cause regime change had 
respectively an average cost of 3.4 percent and 2.3 percent of the GNP (HSEO, 2007, p.170). 
So it seems that the economic costs that South Africa had to bear in the first period were not 
that high compared with other sanction episodes and the costs were even lower than the 
average costs caused by failing sanctions. These relative low costs have been caused by the 
weakness of the sanctions, import substitution, sanction busting and the slow and incremental 
implementation of sanctions mentioned above.   
 
 
3.2.3 Political costs  
 
Apart from level of economic hardship exercised, there is no reason for target states to obey 
without political costs (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999/2000). Political costs are the emergence 
of any anti-governmental activity that is costly to the government (Allen, 2008, p.916). 
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Political costs might give new more progressive leaders the change to take power or persuade 
the old leaders to change their policies, because costs of obeying have become lower than 
costs of disobeying (Losman1979, p.128).       
 On the basis of the South African case, it can be concluded that the level of political 
costs depends on two factors. Firstly, it depends on the strength of economic sanctions. 
According to Losman (1979, 128), Sanctions will only succeed, if the economic pressure is 
large enough to cause domestic political pressure that will push the government to do what the 
sender demands. There could be a political dependency reason; if potential targets are 
politically strong and senders are strategically dependent on the target, the target is less likely 
to encounter strict sanctions and more likely to encounter weak and symbolic sanctions 
(Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997, p.616). This is especially the case when the dependent countries 
are strong economic players in the international community that might be crucial for the 
effectiveness of sanctions, such as the United States. In the past, the US often turned a blind 
eye to human rights violations of countries that opposed communism (Apodaca, 2006 ,p.85).
 Secondly, it depends on target‟s domestic political strength. The lower the level of 
political stability, the higher the change of sanction success (HSEO, 2007, p.166). The logic 
behind this relationship is that political unstable country cannot handle much more politically 
domestic unrest. Sanctions might form the last straw that breaks the camel‟s back by creating 
more political unrest.  The target‟s political strength, in turn, depends on two factors. Firstly, 
it depends of the amount of opposition against the government within the country. A 
homogenous population with few opponents of the government will not be likely to pressure 
its government to obey the sender.  The idea behind this argument is given by Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg (1999, p. 51).They argue that international sanctions will only have a positive 
influence on the target‟s policymakers if there is a good organized opposition group whose 
political strength could be enlarged as a chain reaction of sanctions. If such a group does not 
exist, it is hard to make sanctions work. In a country where there are more competitors for 
power, the population might revolt against its government and choose other leaders. Secondly, 
it depends on the level of suppression of the opponents. If there is lot of political dissent, it 
does not necessarily mean that the government is political unstable. This is especially the case 
when the target is autocratic. In such case, the government can suppress the political unrest by 
eliminating its opponents in order to secure its authority (Escribà‐Folch 2012, p.684). A 
strong government might be able to decrease the effect of sanctions by increasing the costs of 
revolting for its opponents.         
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3.2.3.1 South Africa’s political strength   
 
The conditions for sanctions to cause political costs were present in South Africa. In South 
Africa there was a great amount of opposition, because the government only looked after the 
interests of the white population (Clark & Worger, 2001). So, opponents and supporters of the 
government also emerged along racial lines. The South African case suits with Chua‟s (2003) 
ethnic tension emergence pattern Chua (2003) argues that the pursuit of democratization and 
the process of liberalization have often generated ethnic violence, when a racial minority 
dominates the poor indigenous majority economically. The black population in South Africa 
was excluded from the democratization process and did not profit economically from the 
liberal markets. Sanction implementers can anticipate on this division line by weakening the 
government and strengthening the groups in society that are in favor of the sender‟s will 
(Blanchard and Ripsman 1999/2000). Sanction can increase political instability and, in this 
way, destabilize the government. In South Africa these groups were present in the society, so 
sanctions had the potential to cause high political costs. However, the sanctions against South 
Africa barely caused political costs in the first period of the sanction episode due to sanction 
weakness caused by South African international political strength and government‟s domestic 
political strength.           
 The strength of economic sanctions has already been discussed, but there was also a 
political reason why the sanctions were relatively weak until mid-1980s. The political reason 
was the Cold War. South Africa played on the concern of the West about revolutionary 
communist movements in Africa to persuade many western countries to be thoughtful on their 
attitudes towards apartheid (Robinson & Boutwell, 1996, p.599).The governing NP party 
implemented the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950 that outlawed any communist party 
in South Africa (Guelke, 2005, p.94). South Africa sent a clear message to the west; South 
Africa was one of „the good guys‟ and was fighting upcoming communist movements caused 
by decolonization (Robinson & Boutwell, 1996, p.599). Due to its anti-communist attitude the 
increasing brutal measures of Apartheid were partly ignored in the beginning and conciliatory 
approaches were given priority. The United States and Britain even used their vetoes in the 
UN Security Council to hinder everything more than an official disapproval of apartheid 
(Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.86). Oil and arms embargo, as mentioned above, were applied, 
because oil and arms were essential for maintaining apartheid.  Such sanctions had the 
potential to weaken the government, but due to their weakness their capability to inflict 
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political costs was limited.          
 Small political costs can still have a relative big impact on weak governments when 
they cause unrest, such as politically motivated ethnic violence. However, instead of being a 
victim of ethnic violence, the South African government used ethnic violence as a suppression 
tool to minimize political upheaval. These suppression practices of the black majority were 
the reason why sanctions were imposed, but also made the sanctions less effective. Black 
political parties with the goal to unite all Africans to fight for political rights, such as the ANC 
and PAC were beaten down and prohibited (Thompson, 2000, p.210). Demonstrations against 
apartheid were met with brutal police violence. The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 is a well-
known event in which innocent black people were killed in order to silence the black 
community (Thompson, 2000 p.210).These fierce reactions of the government increased the 
costs for the black community to overthrow the apartheid government.   
 Another suppression tool used by government in order to prevent economic sanctions 
from doing their job was the unbalanced income distribution along racial dividing lines. The 
black population was exploited and kept poor on purpose (Chua, 2003, p.169). The rapid 
annual GNP growth in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s mentioned above did advantage the standard of 
living for whites only. In this way, costs of overthrowing the apartheid government for blacks 
were increased. Economic sanctions barely had political costs  
        
3.3 The turning point and intensified sanctions: Mid-1980s until 1994 
 
 
3.3.1 Issue salience 
 
As Ang and Peksen (2007, p.138) explain, if a target state is more willing to bear high costs 
(like South Africa), senders should be more resolute in achieving their policy goal. Their 
results indicate that the sender‟s issue salience has an effect on the sanction success. The 
higher the priority and importance attributed by the sender to an issue, the more determination 
the sender will have to make the sanctions successful (Ang & Peksen, 2007, p.143).   
 Around the mid-1980s a crucial change occurred. Global anti-apartheid movements 
had expanded immensely. The increasing political unrest in the 1970‟s was increasingly 
getting covered by international media and this affected policymaking (Schraeder, 1994, 
p.218). The global public saw a crisis of ethnic violence and suppression that was clearly the 
fault of the South African government. Additionally the connections between the different 
17 | P a g e  
 
anti-apartheid movements all over the world started to connect and form a strong transnational 
civil society. Lobbyist, NGO‟s (grassroots and other sorts of NGO‟s), Multinationals, 
congressmen and Banks from all over the world pressured reluctant governments to 
implement more adequate sanctions (Klotz, 1996, p177). Two major trade partners that got 
pressured to do more were the US and Britain (U.S Department of State, 2009).  
 Before 1986 Britain was one of the few members in the Commonwealth that opposed 
Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa. Thatcher opposed Commonwealth sanctions, 
because she claimed it would hurt Britain‟s trade and make black South Africans suffer 
(Neville, 2013, p.265). However, in 1986 Britain changed its protective tone and agreed to 
Commonwealth sanctions. The sanctions prohibited government funding for trade missions to 
South Africa, new government loans to the government of South Africa and selling computers 
for the South African military forces. Cooperation with South Africa on oil, nuclear and 
military technology was also proscribed (The new York times, 1985).    
 In 1986, the U.S. introduced the Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid Act (CAAA) over 
President Reagan's veto. The act was a grand victory for American anti-apartheid movement, 
which had worked hard for strong sanction s. The repression had caught the eye of the 
American public and raised the topic with Congress (Edgar, 1990, p.1). The act prohibited 
trade in, coal, kruggerrands, uranium, and oil.  Most importantly, it also prohibited all new US 
investments and loans to South Africa (Guelke, 2005, p.196).The stricter sanctions had a 
positive effect on the economic and political costs.  
 
 
.3.2 Economic costs in combination with sanction type 
 
Another factor that has an effect on the success of sanctions is the type of sanction used. 
HSEO come to the conclusion that use of different sorts of sanctions has a higher success rate 
than the use of one sort of sanction. Cases in which export, import and financial sanctions are 
all implemented have a success rate of 40 percent. Trade sanctions (either solely import, 
solely export, or both) have a success rate of 25 percent. The sole use of financial sanctions 
produced a success rate of 36 percent (HSEO, 2007, p.168).    
 It seems that the use of financial sanctions has a positive influence on the success of 
sanctions. Financial embargoes may be more successful, because they have a more direct 
effect on leader elites by restricting their foreign currency flow. The elites are highly likely to 
depend more on foreign capital than the public (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997, p.610). Sanctions 
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have a better chance to succeed when they focus on creating revenue loss for groups that 
support the government (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992).  
Early in the sanction episode there mostly were trade sanctions. Relatively late in the 
sanction episode, in the 1980s the commonwealth, the IMF and the US introduced adequate 
financial sanctions (Riddell, 1986, pp.1-5). These sanctions further increased the pressure on 
the South African government which already had to deal with balance of payments difficulties 
and recession in the beginning of the 1980s due to the anti-apartheid movements, risk 
assessments and a global crisis. Its economic strength had declined and finance had become 
South Africa‟s weak spot (Orkin, 1989, p.26).       
 In 1983 the first adequate financial sanctions were introduced. The IMF denied South 
Africa additional funds. This denial was an initiative of the US that used its great power in the 
IMF. In the past times of balance-of-payments problems and recession, South Africa relied on 
the IMF for bridging loans, but now this path was gone. Although this IMF refusal did not 
stop South Africa from getting private loans, it did make foreign finance costly and made 
loans from Bank of International Settlements impossible. The high costs of borrowing caused 
a considerable increase in debt (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.162). At the same time, the value 
of both the rand and gold diminished and, therefore, the value of the debts increased in US 
dollars (Riddell, 1986, p.1). Gold played a very important part in the economy. Forty percent 
of all foreign exchange income came from gold and was fundamental to the balance of 
payment (Riddell, 1986, p.1). In 1985, the 17 billion dollar debt was a 12.6 billion Rand debt 
(20 percent of GDP). By1984, it had risen to a 24.3 billion dollar debt that converted to a 48.2 
billion Rand debt (46 percent of GDP) (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.164). Additionally, due to 
the unrest, short-term loans became the most favorite form of borrowing in South Africa. So 
the proportion of the short-term to long-term debts increased to 66 percent in 1985. Other 
developing countries had an average proportion of 44 percent (Orkin, 1989, p.26). 
 The South African proportion appeared to be way too high for a healthy economy, 
because a financial crisis arose (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.165). The government was urged 
to react in order to keep the economic and political situation under control. The government 
resorted to old solution and implemented the state of emergency. This method had worked in 
the past after international commotion after the Sharpeville massacre the Soweto uprising. In 
the past it boosted investor trust and decreased capital outflow (Guelke, 2005, p. 164). 
However, the state of emergency only worked counterproductively, because the confidence in 
the economy of foreign investors dropped dramatically. The influential Chase Manhattan 
Bank made the call to stop providing loans to the country. In response many bankers decided 
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to transfer their investments to funds outside South Africa. This brought an end to an 
increasingly essential source of funds for South Africa for future growth opportunities 
(Riddell, 1986, p.4). This caused the Rand to drop in value even more and the financial crisis 
got worse (Riddell, 1986, p.5). South Africa could not repay its obligations, because it had a 
short-term debt (term of one year) of 43.3 billion Rand, an account surplus of 5 billion Rand 
and a reserve of 784 million Rand(Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.165).  
 Between 1985 and 1990, the government did their best to ease the financial crisis by 
freezing payments on 58 percent of its total foreign debt, organizing debt negotiation in 1987, 
restricting the media to report about apartheid, lifting certain petty apartheid policies like the 
pass laws and by releasing prisoners (Riddell, 1986, p.4). With moderate successful debt 
negotiations the apartheid government rescheduled obligations and temporarily saved the day. 
Although the government avoided a bankruptcy, things were not getting any better soon 
(Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.169). South Africa stayed in serious need of ﬁnance and calls for 
change were becoming more prominent. Government problems with meeting its debt 
obligations in combination with increasing political unrest and already low business trust 
caused more stagnation and capital outflow (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.169).  Additionally 
the US and the Commonwealth sanctions caused trade with its major trading partners to drop 
dramatically. Trade with the US decreased with 40 percent in 1987 and trade with Britain 
decreased with 15 percent in 1986 compared to before the new sanctions implementation 
(Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.12). Additionally, the bad economic situation caused by South 
Africa‟s financial vulnerability, financial sanctions, declining profitability and the anti-
apartheid movement caused led to the departure of many companies. Between 1984 and 1990, 
around one third of all foreign firms, especially the US firms, left the country (Riddell, 1986, 
p.3).            
 Financial sanctions limited South Africa‟s policy options. In this way South Africa 
could not properly tackle its political and economic hardship. From 1985 to 1992, South 
Africa‟s GDP grew only 0.5 percent per year, and inflation rate was 15.3 percent per year. Its 
economic performance was worse than in any eight-year span after the Second World War. 
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3.3.3 Political costs   
 
What must be noted is that sanctions were part of a greater anti-apartheid strategy. Political 
parties like the ANC, religious groups, trade unions and more than hundred other activist 
organizations inside South Africa engaged in an intense struggle for race equality for several 
decades which found its peak in the late 1980s (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.3)  
 West showed its support for political resistance group such as the African National 
Congress (ANC). Partly because of the sanctions, these political resistance groups became 
more cohesive and the violence increased (Kaempfer et al., 1999, p.51). In the 1980s there 
was increasing political violence coming from the black population, mostly coming from 
uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC (South African History Online). The 
MK had invaded South Africa from its bases in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola and 
carried out a strategy of terror in urban white areas since 1960‟s. Due to their violence the 
ANC was seen as a terrorist group by many countries. However, in the 1980s, that gradually 
changed due to the anti-apartheid movement (Norval, 1990). The new sanctions were used as 
a communication tool to encourage the South African government to acknowledge opposition 
groups (Klotz, 1995, p.475) For instance the anti-apartheid comprehensive act of 1985 had a 
provision that demanded for better coordination and communication with Nelson Mandela‟s 
ANC and other organizations participating in the struggle against apartheid. This signaled a 
“shift in U.S. policy to change its characterization of the ANC from a terrorist, communist-
backed organization to a group with a legitimate voice in South Africa” (Mokoena, 1993, p. 
52). The support from the west validated the anti-government activity and helped the ANC to 
channel the upheavals into a rise of domestic support (Klotz, 1996, p.187) ANC had become a 
legitimate political opposition group; a group that  Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1999, p. 51) 
call a necessity in order to make sanctions work. In1990 the South African government 
legalized the ANC that later played a huge role in the negotiations between 1990 and 1994, 
partly because of sanctions (Mtimkulu, 2000).      
 The anti-apartheid movement including the sanctions also caused disunity among the 
white elites. Business elites started to demand political change. Business elites increased their 
demands for political reform in the mid-1980s when they faced more political protests and 
labor strikes (Guelke, 2005). Important corporations, such as Barloworld Limited, made 
themselves clear about the urgency of huge political change and publically addressed the role 
of foreign pressure (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p.141). These increasing labor strikes were 
caused by the strengthened black labor unions. The government legalized black unions in 
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1979 and gave the union‟s limited collective bargaining rights. Most important and biggest 
union was the nonracial COSATU, which was affiliated with the ANC. Membership of labor 
union increased during the 1980s and by 1987 the new black trade unions took a leading role 
in the opposition. Due to their strikes 5.8 million work days were lost in 1987 (Byrnes, 1997). 
 
3.3.4 Effects of political and economic costs  
The economic and political costs described above made the NP government party willing to 
embrace change. In 1990, the ANC was legalized and in 1991 the pillars of apartheid were 
abolished.  These moves of the government were clearly made to comply with the conditions 
of Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act for the ending of US sanctions (Guelke, 2005, p.197).  
 To return to the debate between Mandela and De Klerk: who was right? De Klerk 
states in his own book that the overall anti-apartheid movement was an important factor. (de 
Klerk 114). He states that the loss of financial support and its effect became a “source of 
social unrest” (de Klerk, 1999, p.183). De Klerk cannot see the causal connection, but 
political and economic costs were caused by the anti-apartheid movement including the 
economic sanctions. By using de Klerk‟s own reasoning, sanctions did contribute partly to the 
end of apartheid. Mandela was right. 
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4. Conclusion  
 
In the period of 1962-1985 sanctions were not having the desired effect. South Africa 
outmaneuvered sanction senders by applying import substitution, using black knights and 
having a strong economy. Economic costs were not taking their toll and South Africa had 
rapid economic growth. This all changed around 1985. Around that year a downward spiral 
was started. A financial crisis, economic sanctions, intensified anti-apartheid sentiments in the 
international community and civil society and domestic intensified demonstrations together 
caused the apartheid to spiral out of control. Financial sanctions were introduced on top of the 
trade sanctions which created more forceful sanctions. Additionally, there already was 
financial vulnerability caused by anti-apartheid sentiments and a global crisis. The 
international community anticipated the financial vulnerability well by introducing financial 
sanctions in a time where South Africa was in big need of more finance. The pressure from 
the international community and civil society (issue salience) to end apartheid also increased. 
Their disapproval was partly signaled by intensifying the economic sanctions. By giving its 
support to the black population, the international community caused more political unrest in 
South Africa. The political unrest, financial crisis partly caused by economic sanctions and 
the increasing anti-apartheid sentiments caused many multi corporations to leave South Africa 
which only made matters worse. The increased political and economic costs of the apartheid 
system and diminished economic and financial strength led to a critical level that would 
eventually lead to the abolishment of Apartheid. Apartheid was beaten by complex network of 
factors; factors that all influenced each other. In the network of factors economic sanctions 
played an adequate role. 
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